Moderation

After exactly a six-month hiatus, I am ready to start writing again.

I am about to delve into Pity the Nation, an account of the Lebanon civil war by former Times journalist, Robert Fisk. Lebanon was, of course, a staging ground for a tragic tug-of-war between nations, and just paging through the preface had me thinking of Pakistan, another country pulled apart at the seams by internal and external forces. I highly recommend reading Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, an exhaustively researched account of how politics and carefully timed circumstances allowed Pakistan to develop and export nuclear technology under the noses — and often under cover provided by — the United States and the West. As the title would indicate, the book places most of the blame on US administrations and the Pakistani military, both of whose obsession with external interests (Afghanistan and India/Kashmir respectively) unleashed a nuclear monster that raged and continues to rage completely out of control. But more importantly, the book shows how a single-minded preoccupation with a specific strategic tack, historical legacy, or perceived predestined purpose creates a fertile ground for extremism. Actions build upon past actions, and the result is a highly path-dependent stream of events that becomes increasingly difficult to undo as time goes on.

As I walked to my car today, this got me thinking about moderation, and specifically how moderate political forces are constantly stifled by the phenomenon mentioned above, even when the actors involved are perhaps ultimately seeking moderate outcomes themselves. Whether it involves supporting regimes, brokering ceasefires, or creating governments, the actors that hope to achieve moderate, stable outcomes often do so by suppressing or marginalizing other voices in the political discourse, and this exclusion foments extremism in the fringes. We can argue its intentions and agendas, but few would disagree that the US hoped to foster a triumph of democracy over the uncertain arbitrariness of authoritarian rule. The paradox lies in the fact that The US’s pursuit of political moderation allowed for no margin of error, and with this comes no discourse, no compromise. But compromise is precisely the reason that competitive democracies, for example, frequently achieve moderate, political status quos. The institutional constraints of democracy force enemies competing for power to concede losses to realize successes in the final political outcome, but the process begins with the equal inclusion of these voices in the first place.

While in the case of Pakistan, such discourse did not exist; there was only opportunism. Both the US and Pakistan used the same political Islam to their specific advantages, and both discarded this voice when it had outlived its purpose. There is no political outlet for this voice to achieve its goals. Today, both the US and Pakistan may continue to try to achieve a moderate political climate, but what they really are seeking is a way to effectively suppress dissent, and that dissent can only find its voice through subversive violence.

Many argue that political Islam is incongruent with Western-style democracy. Here, I am making no attempt to advocate the creation of one form of government over another. I am merely pointing to a paradox. The Islamic-West divide is the result of a legacy of political involvement in the East by the West, and the case of Pakistan is only one such instance. Moderation implies compromise, stability, an exchange of information, and even peace under the banner of any style of government. I don’t doubt that, for reasons both selfish and otherwise, the US would like to see moderation in the Islamic world. But US policy has not addressed systems; it has addressed symptoms. Its divide-and-conquer, support-and-suppress style of foreign policy cannot draw the moderate cream to the top. It manipulates the cost of admission into the political discussion.

Still Alive

This blog is still active. I have been busy with other things lately, and posting will resume shortly.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb really feeling the squeeze now

Algiers must be turning the screws on its last remaining active terrorist group, because there were two more consecutive bombings today this morning in Bouria, southeast of the capital and directly south of Tizi-Ouzou in the Kabylia region. BBC reports (and if El Watan has fixed the hiccups in their site, here’s their report for any Francophiles) today’s attacks hit a military headquarters and a hotel (for the military too?). Alle at Western Sahara Info figured the death toll from yesterday’s attack to be around 43, and taken with today’s 11 dead (which is sure to rise), this is likely to be the deadliest spate of violence in the country since the GSPC-cum-Al Qaeda ramped up their efforts a little over a year ago.

Amongst the concerned blogs, we’ve debated the official assertion that AQ is in its final hour in Algeria. Given the endless stream (and indeed, an apparent increase) of attacks, at first glance, it appears the government is trying to save face and distract attention from its inability to handle the problem. On the other hand, however, perhaps AQ is puffing its chest to hide the fact that it has been pushed to the brink. Personally, I’m not sure it matters whether every last member is dragged from the woods and killed. The political disconnect between the government/military and the population still has yet to be resolved. I think we can expect disaffection within the population to bubble up in one form of another (most likely Islamic and populist in tenor), organized terrorism notwithstanding.

During the massacres of the 1990s, most of the violence was concentrated in the Mitija Plain south of Algiers, frighteningly dubbed the “triangle of death”. Since I know how much the media love their triangles, I took the liberty of estimating a new one for this latest campaign. Tourists to Algeria might want to avoid hiking alone in this area.

(Para ler em Português, clique no link abaixo).

Another one for Boumerdès

In the wake of upbeat reports from Algiers that the terrorist insurgency is in its death throes, word has just come in about a new attack on a police building, full of recruits, near Boumerdès, east of Algiers, in or around where almost every single attack of the last year has been. The alleged sole remaining terrorist organization in the country, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (nee GSPC), will no doubt claim responsibility, which will only serve the heighten fear and confusion. Why does the Algerian government remain so confident that AQ is close to being defeated, when there has been a steady stream of government-targeted attacks since the violence escalated again a few years ago? By Algiers estimates, there are but a few hundred terrorists left hiding in the hills in and around the Kabylie region of the country, and this small group has been routed by the government and plagued with recruiting problems.

For one, it’s very easy to pinpoint the likely location of these individuals. Almost every single attack has occurred in a small slice of real estate stretching from the capital to Tizi-Ouzou in Kabylie, with many of the targets either government or infrastructure in nature. The Kabyle Berbers, a minority ethnic group in a contentious relationship with Arabophonic Algiers, have reportedly allowed AQ to hang around their villages, united under what some view as anti-government solidarity. Whether the government is too afraid to venture into these areas, flush out AQ, and finish the job is a possible topic for discussion. I suspect, however, that the ongoing threat provides an opportunity for the military and government to prolong an endless state of emergency.

That said, there may be some truth to the recruiting problem. The war of the 1990s and the wildly unpopular insurgent campaigns of AQ’s predecessors are evidence that overthrowing the Algerian state via sporadic guerrilla tactics is simply not a tenable goal at this juncture. I doubt roadside bombs in the remote hills are rousing all that much excitement among disaffected, unemployed youth these days. Overthrowing the regime in Algiers is not exactly the jihadist rallying cry of the Iraqi, Afghani, Chechnyan, or Somali theaters.

Still, Algeria loves confusion. With a huge population of jobless young males roaming the streets, there is often a palpable tension in the air, which both sides of the conflict have sought to exploit to their advantage. The government seems to thrive on alternating between declaring victory and blasting back at terrorists in an endless cycle of tug-of-war. For their part, the remaining terrorists – whatever their numbers – get a world audience for their cause. As with the previous civil war, the two seem clasped in an uneasy handshake, and as always, the general population is caught in the middle.

(Para ler em Português, clique no link abaixo).

Back in: the U.S.S.R.

Oh, and how about that Russia going to war with Georgia? It’s going to take a lot of petroleum-selling for Russia to take back all its Soviet-era real estate, but it looks like they’re starting with the easy targets first. Best of luck, Mr. Putin. Despots everywhere are crossing their fingers for you!

(Para ler em Português, clique no link abaixo).

Emotions

With so much military coupin’ going on in Mauritania these last few days, it’s hard to focus on U.S. politics (well, for me, maybe, but probably not for pundits stateside). Mauritania’s brief flirtation with civilian rule may be coming to a long-anticipated end (be sure to check out coverage in these blogs, which is much better than anything you’ll find in the news. These guys are the real nerds), but democratic politics in the U.S. are in full swing, with all the campaign shenanigans.

I have been interested in (The Political Mind author) Drew Westen’s column in the Huffington Post. Neurologists, psychologists, and political scientists alike can debate the minutiae of his theories (and I have yet to read the book myself), but I think this entry, now a few days old, hit it right on the mark. Specifically, Westen draws attention to the McCain campaign’s recent strategies of attack – tactics which the Obama campaign – in classic Democratic fashion – has failed to effectively address and mitigate. The result of this, of course, is that the McCain campaign is gaining precious ground on Obama.

Given the economy and Bush/Rep unpopularity, this election should be a slam dunk for the Dems, but it is shaping up to be anything but. The cornerstone of Westen’s theory is that, from a psychological perspective, emotional arguments are often much more powerful than those that appeal to logic, and specifically, that the Republicans have been successful in using arguments that trigger strong emotional responses in the electorate, something the Democrats have not been able (or are unwilling) to do themselves. Westen points to the way the Republicans have branded Obama as un-American and untrustworthy, out of touch and an elitist – a celebrity over a politician. It didn’t take long for McCain to take a page out of the Karl Rove playbook (or, you know, hire his operatives) – the very same plays that put “a decider”, who had no taste for complicated issues, in the White House. Like Gore before him, Obama has yet to effectively head these accusations off at the pass, and the polls show the median voter is starting to internalize them. Westen is convinced (and I am inclined to agree), that Obama (a gifted speaker and rouser of spirits) should fight emotion with emotion. The Dems have consistently rested their campaign on the hope that a sound, logical platform will cut through the noise, and that strategy has proven electorally costly. Let’s just say that as someone who would definitely not like to see a four-year extension of the Republican mandate in the White House, I hope Obama heeds his advice.

(Para ler em Português, clique no link abaixo).

Maghrebi Vice

Muammar Al-Gaddafi in his Tubbs & Crockett best at a recent Mediterranean Union press conference.

(Para ler em Português, clique no link abaixo).

The New Economics of Development

Just as the post-WWII neo-liberal consensus shaped the way the global North engaged the global South (i.e. “development” through the opening up of markets via democratization, often through the efforts of international institutions and corporations beholden to their Western creators), the rising Asian titans are rapidly changing the way business is done at the bottom of the GDP totem pole. And by “titans” I am thinking specifically of China, and by “bottom of the GDP totem pole” I am speaking chiefly of Africa.

China continues to cut a path across the continent. Whether it’s securing the contract to overhaul Niger’s aging power grid or putting up garish hotels in Khartoum, it seems every day brings news of Chinese investment. For followers of Africa’s plight, one might argue any development is good development (especially when it’s providing a basic public good, such as infrastructure), and indeed, China seems to be doing quite a bit of that. But as we all know, this has come at a price. Not only has China’s willingness to turn a blind eye to the politics of just about everyone earned it top bidding privileges in some of the nastiest – and lucrative – corners of the world, its investment interests have brought a new dimension to China’s veto on the world stage.

China itself has always been a thorn in the side of the human-rights movement, but China’s purchasing of access to markets has expanded and aggravated this problem beyond its borders. It’s no secret that economic (and the attendant diplomatic) ties with China have been absolutely essential for many authoritarian and cronyist governments, and such a relationship has served to strengthen otherwise weak leaders, who pursue oppressive tactics and suppress political dissent (perhaps most prominently today in Sudan, with the Darfur crisis). You might even say that a lack of civil society on either side of the equation makes all of this possible: the client states are devoid of any civilian-government connection – their populations are stifled, marginalized, and disaffected; in China, internal tension is delicately mitigated by a constant economic liberalization with no political liberalization – civil society is not permitted to flourish. In short, no one is accountable to their citizens, so no hands need be restrained.

We all know this is a problem, and we all know that our own (Western) economic dependence on China’s cheap markets keeps our leaders from speaking up too loudly. As I heard some author or pundit remark recently, China views us as toothless tigers, helpless to do anything. Indeed, China’s sin is evident, but it’s hardly anything new. For all of our complaints, the Chinese expansion into the global South is barely different from the neo-liberalist campaign, which let in big companies, drained resources, and lined the pockets of despots everywhere, while the citizens of these “liberated” countries were often kept completely out of the loop.

One need only to start throwing around words like “IMF” and “World Bank” in sub-Saharan Africa to get a sense of what austerity and conditionality did for economic and political development there. In essence, China is little more than another actor getting a slice of the pie, only this one could care less about keeping its intentions under its hat. I think it’s time we start looking at China’s sin as indicative of a greater problem we were largely responsible for setting in motion. After all, you don’t need to consult Shell or DeBeers to see that none of this was ever about democracy. Democracy is useful tool for proliferating and stabilizing markets, but not a necessary one, especially when the “market” consists of a single man willing to sell off his country’s resources to the highest bidder. My purpose is not to sermonize, but rather to gain a perspective. Markets *are* mostly good, and many of these countries desperately need access to them. But economic development is no good when it outpaces or occurs in the absence of political development. I understand that this fact is not lost on laypeople, scholars, and governments alike, but I think that it is one long overdue for reconsideration, especially with the next “Chinas” soon to be lining up to get their turn.

(Para ler em Português, clique no link abaixo).

From the people and for the people

Both when I was a political-science student and now in my personal endeavors, I have devoted a lot of time to understanding the Algerian political conflict that led to a civil war in the 1990s, and continues to cause instability and destruction in the country to this day. It’s hard to blame anyone unfamiliar with or uninterested in this crisis; Algeria’s story is a confusing and sad one, made all the worse by the fact that most of the drama plays off in the wings of the world stage. It seems almost everyone has better things to do.

The purpose of this entry is not to harangue the world (including any potential readers) for inattention, or pat myself on the back for caring. I bring it up because the Algerian problem affects us all, and as it continues to unfold (and, hopefully, resolve some day), I will probably devote future entries to highlighting developments. So why should anyone care anyway?

At its heart, the problem with Algeria is a problem common to a lot of the world’s countries: a military regime has a stranglehold on power and groups of dissidents have waged a (in this case, holy) war designed to undermine and, ultimately, collapse this regime. The general population, naturally, is caught in the crossfire. To get into more detail here would require trying to explain a frightening and shadowy dance played by these actors, which has mostly served to solidify a tense status quo – one with which few Algerians are very happy.

But there are lessons here from which we can all learn, and Algeria has a lot to tell us about religion, colonialism, nationalism, terrorism, identity, the power and resilience of ideas, and the often dangerous role played by the governments of all of “our” (read: the West) nations. To peer inside Algeria’s post-independence history is to really understand how a new nation can channel its shared hopes and dreams into creating a country out of a colony, and how quickly that dream can be hijacked by the unconstrained hand of those in power, turning everyone against each other.

The Algerian government (and often the press) will eagerly tell you that all of the violence is the fault of Islamic terrorists, and frequently, they’re right. What they won’t tell you is that the threat of terrorism is a double-edged sword in Algeria: violence threatens the population and the government, but it is also a powerful tool and scapegoat – one which the Algerian government has proved adept at using to their advantage in a post-9/11 world.

The BBC recently ran this, which details news of UN’s security chief resigning, many months after a horrible terrorist attack in Algiers killed several UN employees. The chief, David Veness, resigned after a UN panel determined his officers did not provide “adequate protection” to UN staffers leading up to and following the attack. When I read this, I my first thought was of the Algerian government, which has both continually failed to protect its citizens from the violence, and has used such violence to justify its actions and garner valuable alliances from the West. While the UN may have indeed been remiss in its protection, it seems to me like another instance in which no one in the Algerian government is taken to task, and Algerians are left to pick up the pieces.

(Para ler em Português, clique no link abaixo).

Those damn scarves!

I will cast a vote for Obama in November come hell or high water, but let’s be careful about not treating him like Christ incarnate. If this election is going to be lost because a small cadre of loud, hateful idiots insist Obama is a Muslim and all Muslims are evil people, then I say so be it. We will send a message loud and clear to the rest of the world that this is a land where volume and might rule, and logic, reason, and empathy have no place.

That would make me sad to my very soul, but you know what makes me really sad too? Obama jumping under a desk every time someone with a beard walks by. And do you know why? Because every time he refuses to visit a mosque, or every time he turns away someone at his rallies, he is saying he agrees with those idiots. He is giving them strength and lending credence to their claims and I don’t like it. I want a president I can respect, not simply one who can win a slim majority, because, frankly, either of them could pull that off.

Obama talks a big game about inclusion, but he often acts like every other presidential candidate I have seen: shifty and spineless. We all know McCain could publicly damn Muslims to the fiery pit of hell without eroding his electoral base; I want to see Obama say what he really believes, and isolate these morons to the fringes of the political spectrum where they belong. The more we have this conversation, and the more we hold our politicians to the fire, the harder it is going to be for people with these stupid views to defend themselves in the court of national public opinion. As it stands now, they seem to be winning, and everyone’s too scared about hurting Obama to speak up.

(Para ler em Português, clique no link abaixo).